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Newell: Will Kindness Kill Contract?

ESSAY
WILL KINDNESS KILL CONTRACT?
Douglas K. Newell*
There's mischief afoot in the land of contract. The way we used to
think about contracts and the parties that make them has been challenged.
The challengers either see, or yearn for, a kinder, more cooperative world
where contracting parties are more allies than adversaries. Some suggest
there may be a duty to come to the assistance of the other party to the
contract in times of trouble t The most extreme challengers paint a world
where individual self-interest looks like selfishness, and conformity to
vague community standards appears as kindness and cooperation.2 The
challengers wish to define "the contract" of the parties broadly to include
circumstances occurring before and after the traditional point of
formation. They see in this broader relational view of contract patterns
of flexibility and cooperation which should influence a court's determination of each party's legal obligations.' To a degree this view of
contract has already taken hold through the law's recognition that trade
usages and dealings of the parties may in appropriate cases be part of
* Edmund 0. Belsheim Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark
College. The author wishes to thank Doug Petrina of the Class of '96 for his research assistance.
1. See generally Robert A. Hillman, CourtAdjustment of Long-Term Contracts:An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law 1987 DuKE L.L I (arguing that court adjustment is good policy in
certain situations); Richard E. Speidel, Court-ImposedPriceAdjustments Under Long-Term Supply
Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. RFV. 369 (1981) [hereinafter Speidel, Court-Imposed] (favoring courtimposed price adjustments when an advantaged party fails to accept an equitable adjustment
proposed in good faith); Richard E. Speidel, The Nev Spirit of Contract,2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982)
[hereinafter Speidel, New Spirit] (suggesting that an advantaged party acts in bad faith when it fails
to accept a proposed modification that would be enforceable if accepted).
2. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (proposing that individualism and altruism are the methods for dealing
with substantive issues); Roberto M. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
563 (1983) (discussing the ideological conflict in classical contract theory).
3. See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and DiscretionaryAcceleration:
QfLlewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform CommercialCode, 68 TEx. L. REV. 169, 184-86 (1989).
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their contract.4 As, and if, this broader view becomes more completely
accepted, further change in the law is inevitable. In this Essay I wish to
briefly suggest where we are on this road from individualism to sharing,
where the visionaries of cooperation might wish to take us and the legal
theory they might use for the journey. If they succeed we may one day
discover that we have a new theory of liability. I think of it as implied
fiduciary liability but prefer to call it "commercial palimony." In
palimony, as you may recall, cohabitation sort of slides into marriage. In
commercial palimony ordinary contract sort of slides into partnership. I
will argue that a major purpose of forming a traditional contract is to set
limits of liability--between what the law requires and what should be left
to individual discretion and conscience. As the contract and the
relationship blur together, that function may be lost. I will return to this
theme in my conclusion.
Our story begins with a case involving a contract between an asphalt
paving contractor and an oil company.' Their dispute tells much about
where we are and hints at where we might go.
Prior to 1963 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. performed relatively
small paving jobs such as driveways and service stations on the island of
Oahu.6 Nanakuli's management wished to expand and compete with the
largest paving contractor on Oahu for major roads, airports and other
large paving contracts.7 At the same time, Shell Oil Co. had only a small
percentage of the asphalt supply market on Oahu and no asphalt
terminals in Hawaii.! Shell wished to build an asphalt terminal on Oahu
and to take a chunk of the supply market away from Chevron which
supplied the largest paving contractor. 9
In 1963 and again in 1969, Nanakuli and Shell entered into longterm asphalt supply contracts. 10 The contracts committed Nanakuli to
purchase all the asphalt it required from Shell and to pay "Shell's Posted
Price at time of delivery."" The purpose of the arrangement was to
promote Nanakuli by guaranteeing asphalt supply at a discounted price
(the discount came from commissions paid by Shell pursuant to a

4. U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202(a), 2-208(2) (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 202(5), 203(b), 220-23 (1979).
5. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
6. Id. at 780.
7. Id. at 780-81.
8. Id. at 780.
9. Id. at 780-81 & nn.9-10.

10. Id. at 781.
11. Id. at 778, 780.
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companion distribution contract). 2 Shell, on its part, would prosper
from the growth of Nanakuli's business by expanding Shell's share of the
market, thus justifying the cost of the new asphalt
Oahu asphalt
3
terminal.'
Between 1963 and 1974, the parties appear to have had a very close
business relationship. Officials of Nanakuli called it a partnership 4 and
the Ninth Circuit opinion characterized it as "close, almost symbiotic."' 5
For example, Nanakuli used the Shell logo and colors on its trucks 6
and Shell was heavily involved in assisting Nanakuli to obtain expansion
financing. 7
Sadly, their beautiful friendship came to an end in January of 1974
when, as a result of the Arab Oil Embargo, Shell raised its posted price
for asphalt from $44 to $76 per ton. 8 Nanakuli claimed it was entitled
to the lower price for 7,200 tons of asphalt, which it ordered to fulfill its
obligations under bids and contracts made before it was notified of the
price increase.' 9 Unfortunately for Nanakuli there had been recent
management changes at Shell and the new executives insisted upon the
higher price.20
Nanakuli sued Shell for breach of the 1969 contract based upon
Shell's failure to "price protect" Nanakuli. 21 "Price protection" was
defined as the supplier maintaining the old price on a quantity or for a
time period sufficient for the purchaser to complete work committed at
the old price.22 Nanakuli first asserted that in 1969 all material suppliers
in the asphaltic paving trade price protected and thus, there was a usage
of trade incorporated into the Nanakuli-Shell contract. 23 Secondly,
Nanakuli asserted that on the two previous occasions between 1969 and
1974 when Shell raised its price, Shell had price protected Nanakuli and
thus this course of performance should be used to interpret their
obligations. 4 Finally, Nanakuli argued that "even if price protection

12. Id. at 780-81.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 780-81 & n.10.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 781.
Id.
Id. at 777, 786.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 786, 788-89.

21.

Id.at 777.

22. Id. at 778 n.4.
23. Id. at 778.
24. Id.
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was not incorporated into their contracf' Shell was obligated to provide
it "because price protection was the commercially reasonable standard for
fair dealing in the asphaltic paving trade in Hawaii in 1974."25
As might be expected Shell responded by relying upon the express
price term in the written contract: "Shell's Posted Price at time of
delivery." Shell argued that "price protection" could not be reasonably
construed as consistent with that term, and therefore the express term
should control.26 Shell further argued that the two occasions Shell price
protected Nanakuli were simply waivers by Shell of
its rights rather than
27
a course of performance interpreting those rights.
The jury returned a verdict for Nanakuli and awarded $220,800 in
damages.2 s The trial judge granted Shell's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and gave judgment for Shell. 29 Nanakuli
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Nanakuli case affords an opportunity to examine major changes
from the classical contract law of Williston to the realism of Llewellyn
incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code. Shell's legal position
would have been much stronger under classical contract law. A classical
theorist would have focused upon the written contract between Shell and
Nanakuli executed on April 1, 1969. This writing would be "the
contract." The classical rules would have made it very difficult to explain
or supplement, let alone contradict, the writing with evidence of anything
that happened before or after April 1, 1969.30 This preference for the
writing was a result of at least three beliefs of the classicists. First,
contracting parties had the ability to determine, as of the moment of
contracting, their respective rights and duties for the entire term of the

25. Id.
26. Id. at 779.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 777.
29. Id.
30. See Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC
Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811, 812 ("In the Williston theory the written agreement was emphasized;
the certainty of a writing was to be preserved and not undercut by extrinsic evidence."); see also 4
WILLIAM H. PAGE, TiE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2145, at 3735 (2d ed. 1920); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 95, at 349-50 (Walter H.E. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957); John
E. Murray, Jr., The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv.
269, 274 (1972) (discussing various rules based upon "the sacredness of the writing").
If a written contract is entered into, the meaning and effect of the contract depends on
the interpretation given the written language by the court. The court will give that
language its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will not
even admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning to be.
I WILLISTON, supra, § 95, at 349-50.
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contract and the ability to accurately express those rights and duties in
the writing.3" Second, the writing was a more accurate record of the
agreement of the parties than other evidence and thus preference for the
writing reduced the possibility of perjury and fraud.3 2 Finally, there
would be less certainty and more litigation if the writing could be
routinely attacked with outside evidence.33 One will, of course, never
know but Shell would likely have been the winner if classical contract
law governed their dispute with Nanakuli.
Enter Karl Llewellyn and the Uniform Commercial Code. Llewellyn,
the most famous of the realists, believed that "the contract" of the parties
consisted of the bargain-in-fact of the parties tempered by rules requiring
minimum commercial morality.34 Llewellyn's vision is best set forth in
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) which states: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other
circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance ... .35 The bargain in fact is ongoing and not static.
Llewellyn believed that to truly understand the bargain of the parties the

31. See 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 610A, at 513-14
(Walter H.E. Jaeger 3d ed. 1961); see also Thompson v. Libbey, 26 N.W. 1,2 (Minn. 1885) (stating
that where the parties to an agreement "have deliberately put their engagements into writing in such
terms as to import a legal obligation,... it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of
the parties... was reduced to writing"); Note, The ParolEvidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 972, 982 (1969) (stating that the effect of the parol evidence rule is 'to encourage
parties to embody their complete agreement in a written contract and thereby to foster reliance upon
it").

32. See 4 WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 610A, at 514 ("[Alfter interpretation has called to its
aid all those facts which make up the environment and setting in which the words are used, the
words themselves remain the best and most important evidence of intention." (footnote omitted));
see also Charles T. McCormick, The ParolEvidence Rule As a ProceduralDevice for Control of
the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 366-67 (1932) (observing that juries are unlikely to take into account
the unreliability of some witnesses); Note, supra note 31, at 982-83 (stating that one of the purposes
of the parol evidence rule is "to prevent juries from being misled by false testimony").
33. Hatley v. Stafford, 588 P.2d 603, 610-11 (Or. 1978) (Lent, J., dissenting).
34. John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 19-20 (1981).
35. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995); see also id. § 1-205(1) ("A course of dealing is a sequence of
previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.");
id. § 1-205(2) ("A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question."); id. § 2-208(1) ("Where the contract ... involves repeated
occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in
without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.").
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writing must be viewed in context.3 6 He had little faith in the ability of
contracting parties to completely and accurately express their bargain in
one writing at one time.37 On the other hand, he believed courts could
and should sift through all of the facts surrounding the transaction of the
parties to find the bargain-in-fact. 8
Most of Llewellyn's ideas were included in the U.C.C. (Hardly
surprising when you consider his major role in drafting it.) Since the
U.C.C. had been enacted in Hawaii, it governed the Nanakuli-Shell
dispute. 39 In particular, the U.C.C. allows both trade usage and course
of performance to explain or supplement express written terms and
course of performance to waive or modify such terms.40 The express
written terms only have preference over trade usage or course of
performance where it is unreasonable to construe them as consistent with
each other.4 '
As was to be expected, Shell argued that Nanakuli had failed to
establish that "price protection" was either a trade usage or a course of
performance. 42 Further, as noted earlier, Shell argued that it was
unreasonable to construe "price protection" as consistent with "Shell's
' The Ninth Circuit found substantial
Posted Price at time of delivery."43
evidence to support the jury verdict, reversed the trial court and
reinstated the verdict for Nanakuli.44 The opinion stresses that Shell
could produce no instance where price protection had not been practiced

36. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 89 (1960) ("No language stands
alone. It draws life from its background."); see also Patterson, supra note 3, at 191-99 (noting
Llewellyn's advocacy for including trade usages and course of dealing in the Code to put the
agreement in its proper context).
37. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN 370 (1960) (maintaining that
parties generally assent to no more than a "few dickered terms, and the broad type of transaction");
see also Patterson, supra note 3, at 175 ("The new conception engineered by Llewellyn presupposes
that the meaning of the agreement of the parties does not depend exclusively or even primarily on
the written terms of one or another document.").
38. See JoEllen Mitchell-Lockyer, Common Law Misrepresentation in Sales Cases-An
Argument for Code Dominance, 19 FORuM 361, 371-72 (1984) (discussing how Llewellyn wanted
courts to find "terms of fact" and not just rely on legal labels); see also Richard Danzig, A Comment
on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621,626 (1975) (stating
that Article 2 is a guide to "law finding"); Murray, supranote 30, at 276-77 (noting that Article 2
endorses flexible standards through empirical verification).
39. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 777 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981).
40. U.C.C. §§ 1-205(3), 2-208(3) (1995).
41. See id. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
42. Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 778-79.
43. Id. at 779.
44. Id. at 806.
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in the trade 5 and that though Shell had only price protected twice
during the contract term, those were the only occasions where it was
appropriate." The court struggled to reconcile price protection with the
price term but ultimately concluded that it did not totally negate or
entirely swallow the price term.47
That, in capsule form, is the Nanakuli case as it is regularly
discussed. The opinion endorses a broader meaning of the contract and
freer use of trade usage and course of performance than classical theory
or some cases interpreting the U.C.C. from a more classical perspective.
Llewellyn would probably have liked the opinion. What interests me
most, however, is the tail end of the majority opinion and the concurrence which responds to it. On the last two pages of a twenty-nine page
opinion, the majority and concurring opinions discuss the applicability of
good faith to the Nanakuli-Shell dispute.4 8
The U.C.C. imposes an obligation of good faith in the performance
of every contract or duty.49 Article 2 of the U.C.C., covering sales of
goods, defines "good faith" in the case of a merchant as "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade."5 The majority accepted Nanakuli's argument that Shell
breached the obligation of good faith when it raised the price from $44
to $76 a ton without giving Nanakuli notice in advance and when it
refused to price protect work already bid at the old price. 5' The majority
concluded that evidence presented by Nanakuli that Chevron gave at least
six weeks notice when it raised its asphalt price to $76 was sufficient
relevant evidence of commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing
in the2 trade for the jury to find that Shell's conduct was not in good
faith.
Judge (now Justice) Kennedy specially concurred saying that a
finding of bad faith was appropriate where, as here, there was evidence
of custom and usage regarding price protection in the asphalt paving
trade.53 He warned, however, that juries should not be permitted to
import price protection "from a concept of good faith that is not based

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-06.
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995).
Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 806.
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 806.
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on well-established custom and usage or other objective standards of
which the parties had clear notice."'54
The above discussion of good faith by the Nanakuli court is the
jumping off point for the remainder of this Essay. The following
questions interest me: (1) If there is no applicable course of performance,
course of dealing or usage of trade, is Shell ever required to come to the
aid of a troubled party like Nanakuli? (2) If so, when and why? (3) How
would such a duty affect contracts and contract law?
Good faith performance is required by both the U.C.C. and the
Second Restatement of Contracts.5" The U.C.C. has two possibly
relevant definitions of good faith. In Article 1, which applies throughout
the Code, the drafters said "honesty in fact" was good faith,56 while in
Article 2, which covers sales of goods, they said that "in the case of a
merchant" good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."57 Numerous critics concluded the U.C.C. definitions were inadequate at best and
futile at worst.5
The problem with the honesty definition is that it is too narrow.
Dishonesty is most likely bad faith but other things can be as well, e.g.,
abusing bargaining power to coerce a modification, interfering with the
other party's performance, arbitrarily and capriciously exercising a power
under the contract, and so forth.5 9 The honesty definition was apparently
chosen by Code drafters in order to enact the "pure heart and.., empty

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
Id. § 2-103(1)(b).

58. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHt. L. REV. 666, 673-74 (1963) (finding the general
obligation of good faith under the Code was "enfeebled" when the Article I definition was limited
to honesty in fact); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968) ("[G]ood faith is an
'excluder.' It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude
a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith." (footnote omitted)); see also Steven J. Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369,
369-70 (1980) ("The good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as a license for the
exercise of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and inconsistent
applications." (footnote omitted)); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REv. 1, 2 (1981) ("Because the good faith

concept serves a variety of functions in a number of contexts, it should not be surprising that these
singular standards are often found wanting.").
59. Summers, supra note 58, at 201-06.
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head" doctrine of good faith purchase.6 That doctrine protected honest
but stupid bankers from defenses when they took negotiable instruments
(e.g., checks or notes) without knowledge of the defenses but under
circumstances that should alert a reasonable banker. Nevertheless by
placing the definition in Article 1, which applies throughout the Code,
the drafters extended its sweep to other situations where it seems
woefully inadequate.
The merchant definition in Article 2 is better. By adding "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade" language, the drafters appear to reach a much broader range of
conduct. There are, however, two significant problems. First, by its terms
this definition only applies to merchants and to sales of goods.6 '
Consequently, it apparently would not apply to non-merchants or to nonsales transactions such as a financing transaction governed by Article 9
of the Code. The second problem is that the merchant definition enacts
the morals of the marketplace. Critics have long suggested that good faith
should mean more than what is the standard of behavior in the trade.62
The Second Restatement of Contracts provision on good faith is the
result of the efforts of many of the critics of the U.C.C. provisions.63 It
merely "imposes upon each party [to a contract] a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement" without attempting
to define that duty.64 Gone are references to honesty, merchants or
commercial standards. The Comment to Section 205 suggests the
following broad meaning: "Good faith performance or enforcement of a
contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes
a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith'
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness. 6 5
The strength of this provision is also its weakness. It is deliberately
vague, thus permitting a court to proscribe a wide variety of conduct.

60. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 798, 812 (1958).
61. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-103(l)(b) (1995).
62. See generally Summers, supra note 58 (stating that good faith should apply to a number
of situations at different intervals in the contracting process).
63. See generally Robert S. Summers, The GeneralDuty of Good Faith-ItsRecognition and
Conceptualization,67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 824-25 (1982) (comparing the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts' definition of good faith with the narrower definition in the U.C.C.).
64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).

65. Id. § 205 cmt. a.
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However, it will necessarily be difficult for a party to determine in
advance precisely what conduct is bad faith. In addition, the Second
Restatement itself is not law but merely expert opinion on what the law
is. When and whether a Court will use this standard is a significant issue.
None of the above "good faith" standards were thought by their
creators to create a general duty to come to the aid of a troubled
party.66 Even the strongest advocates of a kinder, gentler law of
contracts did not place much hope for change in the mainstream pages
of the U.C.C. or the Second Restatement.6 7 Certainly the honesty
standard is of little use as a vehicle for change. Recently, however, some
commentators have begun to explore the possibility that broader good
faith standards might sometimes impose a duty of assistance in long-term
contracts.: It is to those arguments I now turn.
Imagine for a moment that most business executives were really
altruistic and the morals of the marketplace demanded concern for others
over short-term self interest. Suppose most executives would be flexible
and would aid the troubled other party to the contract rather than insist
upon performance according to express written terms. If so, the good
faith obligation upon a merchant to perform according to "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" might take on new
meaning. Instead of simply forbidding a merchant from acting like J.R.
Ewing on "Dallas," the merchant might be required to act like some new
sensitive, caring business executive played in my soap opera by Alan
Alda.
There is in fact some serious support for such an argument.
Professor Stewart Macaulay of the University of Wisconsin Law School
interviewed numerous business executives about contracts and contract

66. Summers, supra note 63, at 834. It is hard to prove a negative. However, the absence of
discussion of the issue by most commentators is certainly some indication and Summers seems quite
clear on the point.
67. See generally Kennedy, supra note 2 (describing an altruistic world as a contrast to
existing contract law in the United States); Unger, supra note 2 (same).
68. See, e.g., Hillman, supranote 1; Speidel, Court-Imposed,supranote I; Speidel, New Spirit,
supra note 1. In 1994 the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. opined that a court should use
good faith as a tool in interpreting contracts within their commercial context. The Commentary of
the Board endorses a very broad meaning of the parties' contract. However, only brief attention is
given to the implications of this broad contextual interpretation and consequently it is unclear under
what circumstances, if any, the Board might support the use of good faith to impose a duty of
assistance. See PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary No. 10 (Final
Draft Feb. 10, 1994).
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law.69 His empirical research suggests that business executives prefer to
settle disputes and work things out.7" They try not to rely upon the
written contract and do not quote contract clauses at one another.7 One
executive told Macaulay: "One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay
in business because one must behave decently., 72 The executives
interviewed rarely used litigation and suggested that a contract lawsuit
had overtones of bad faith.73
In addition to the work of Macaulay, one making this argument
could point to the case of Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.74 In
that case, the seller sued the buyer when the buyer refused to purchase
the stated quantity because of a price rise. A consultant to the fertilizer
industry was asked whether contracts for a fixed quantity were enforced.
He responded: "I have never heard of a contract of this type being
enforced legally.... [T]he fertilizer business is always operated under
what we call gentlemen's agreements
....
[T]his custom exists 'regard7
less of the contractual provisions."' 1
The Columbia case involved an argument concerning trade usage.76
However, just as in Nanakuli,77 the usage evidence seems relevant for
a good faith theory as well. It would appear that the standard for
admission of evidence on the good faith issue would be less rigorous
than that to prove a usage. To show a trade usage you must prove: (1)
a "practice or method of dealing;" (2) regularly observed "in a place,
vocation or trade;" (3) so "as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question. 78 All that you
need for merchant good faith is to prove a "commercially reasonable
79
standard of fair dealing in the trade."

69. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations]; Stewart Macaulay, The
Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, PRAC. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 13

[hereinafter Macaulay, Use and Non-Use of Contracts].
70. See Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of
Contract, I1 LAW & Soc'y REv. 507 [hereinafter Macaulay, Elegant Models]; Macaulay, NonContractualRelations, supra note 69, at 58, 61.
71. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 69, at 61.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 61, 65; Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 70, at 507.
74. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).

75. Id. at 7 n.3.
76. Id. at 8-11.
77. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 779 n.7, 785 n.17 (9th Cir.
1981).

78. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1995).
79. Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 806; see also U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1995).
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There is a serious problem with this argument for a good faith duty
to be flexible, assist the other party, and not rely upon express written
terms of the contract. It is very difficult to separate assistance and
flexibility that a troubled party should expect as a matter of legal right
from that which could be hoped for as a matter of courtesy or convenience. If assistance and flexibility are only a discretionary, sometime
thing in the trade, they can hardly be considered a standard of fair
dealing. Much of Professor Macaulay's research indicates that while
business executives may prefer to work things out for reasons of business
expediency, they understand the written contract is available as a last
resort.80 One commentator who favors imposing this good faith duty has
suggested that it be limited to situations where the troubled party will
otherwise suffer extreme hardship.8" He argues that it is in these cases
that a troubled party should reasonably expect assistance. 2 Of course,
putting a limit on the good faith duty also means that this commentator
can avoid the possibility that this good faith duty might significantly
diminish contract rights. The trouble with his chosen limit is that it is
counter-intuitive. As Fuller noted many years ago, the least likely time
for a merchant to act like Alan Alda (my words, not Fuller's) is when
there is a lot at stake. 3 The majority opinion in Nanakuli suggested the
same concept when, with respect to the good faith issue, it considered
only the testimony that Chevron price protected, and not the testimony
that suppliers of aggregate (rock) to Nanakuli did so.84 The court
reasoned that the suppliers of aggregate were not in the same position as
Chevron and Shell whose prices had risen dramatically because of the oil
embargo.8"
This argument for a duty to assist depends upon the court allowing
detailed testimony regarding the facts of the transaction. Then perhaps
testimony of Professor Macaulay or kindly business executives could be
heard concerning how businesses acted or would act in a similar situation
and why. Ultimately the jury86 will simply have to impose a standard.

80. See Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 69, at 65-67.
81. Hillman, supra note 1, at 13.

82. Id.
83. See Lon L. Fuller, Some Observationson the Course in Contracts,20 J. LEGAL EDUc. 482,
482-83 (1968).
84. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1981).

85. Id.
86. This assumes, of course, a damage action like Nanakuli where there is a jury. Professor
Hillman seems to be concerned with the judge, not the jury. See Hillman, supra note I. His
hypothetical case involves a plaintiffbuyer seeking the equitable remedy of specific performance and
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The more specific the testimony as to what precisely a business executive
would do under the circumstances, the more likely the judge will admit
the evidence and the jury will in fact find a failure to observe "commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade."87 Llewellyn's
solution to this problem was a merchant jury that would hear the
evidence and be able to determine merchant standards."8 His proposal
was never enacted into the U.C.C. and the result may be that the jury

verdict will represent general community standards of fairness.
Perhaps this is really what happened in the Nanakuli case.8 9 The
jury heard evidence of what Chevron, the largest and only other major
asphalt supplier, did under similar circumstances. Chevron's action took
place at the time of the price rise, long after the execution of the
contract, and is therefore not a usage of trade." The court says this is
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict for Nanakuli. 9' Maybe so,
where Chevron and Shell really are the asphalt trade, though this
evidence, by itself, seems pretty slim.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, however, seems on track in
suggesting that all of the usage evidence on the specific practice of
"price protection" was critical to the decision.92 Repeated instances of
a specific practice help to show that the "price protection" was a standard
of behavior and not just a courtesy.

the defendant seller relying upon a commercial impracticability defense. Id. at 15-19. Among other
issues, Professor Hillman considers the power of the judge to reform a contract to achieve justice.
Id. at 19-25.
I am more interested in the implications of good faith in a damage action such as Nanakuli
where a jury is deciding the good faith issue. I think a jury is more likely to impose community
morals upon the parties. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 180-84. Numerous cases leave the good faith
issue to the trier of fact. See, e.g., Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d
167, 175 (8th Cir. 1987) (trier of fact should decide good faith); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1976) (jury should decide whether notice was in good
faith); First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Comprop Inv. Properties Ltd., 752 F. Supp. 1568, 1574 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (determination of good faith is for trier of fact); Karibian v. Paletta, 332 N.W.2d 484, 487
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (trial court erred in granting summary judgment without submitting good faith
purchaser question to jury); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 560 A.2d 1320,
1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (the reasonableness of seller's refusal to consent to buyer's
revocation of acceptance would be jury question). Professor Hillman's views on juries and good faith
are unknown to me.
87. Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 806.
88. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules,
100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 529 (1987).
89. Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 772.
90. See id. at 784-85; U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1995).
91. Nanaladi,664 F.2d at 806.
92. Id.
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In the end, the crucial question is whether Shell violated "commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade."93 The intent of
this definition was apparently to limit contracts by imposing minimum
commercial morality.94 However, failing to price protect does not seem
inherently unfair. There is no general tort duty to rescue.95 It is only
unfair if the contract of the parties as broadly defined gives Nanakuli
reason to expect "price protection" as a matter of right. Therefore, we
need a broader standard of good faith based upon the contract of the
parties.
Even if the merchant standard was sufficient, it would only help if
merchants are like Alan Alda and the transaction is a sale of goods.
Suppose, however, that business executives really are not that much
different from the rest of us. There are a few J.R. Ewings and a few Alan
Aldas and the rest are spread out along a spectrum in between. Or
suppose our transaction is not a sale of goods and thus the merchant
good faith standard is not applicable. Is there any way the broader good
faith standard of the Second Restatement 96 might be used to impose a
duty to assist a troubled party?
The first step would be to convince a court to apply the broader
standard. In a non-U.C.C. case (e.g., an employment or real estate
contract) the chances are good since the Second Restatement is supposed
to be the expert's statement of the general law of contracts. In a U.C.C.
case, the problem is tougher. The argument for the broader standard
would be based on section 1-103, which provides that the Code may be
supplemented by general principles of law unless the principle has been
displaced by a particular Code provision.97 Of course, the argument
against the broader standard is that the honesty standard or the merchant
standard, whichever applies, has displaced the broader standard. Opinion
on the question is divided. Proponents of the broader standard rely upon
the drafting history9 8 and the stated Code policy favoring liberal
construction,9 9 while detractors argue that the Code has defined good

93. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1995).
94. See Murray, supra note 30, at 276-77; see also Summers, supra note 58 (noting that courts
have found that good faith should be a standard by which all people should observe in their dealings
with each other).
95. Ernest J.Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
97. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995).
98. Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 906, 935-36 (1978).
99. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1995); see supra note 36.
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faith and that's that. 00
Assuming the broader standard is applied, where would a duty to
assist come from? The drafters of the Second Restatement saw "good
faith" as a principle enforcing the spirit of the contract by requiring
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party.' ' Consequently, the place to
start is the contract. The argument for a duty to assist begins with the
very open definition of agreement in the U.C.C. mentioned earlier: "the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade
or course of performance as provided in this Act."' 0 2 A court is
directed to look not only at the writings but at all the surrounding
circumstances whether before or after the writing was executed.
The argument is further supported by the relational theories of Ian
Macneil 3 Macneil developed a broad, descriptive social theory of
contract. The theory suggests that more exchanges are based upon
relations than upon discrete transactions. 1 4 It also suggests that wealth
maximization is not the only goal of contracting parties and offers
preservation of the relationship, harmonization of conflicts and reciprocity, among others, as additional goals. 5
So if we were to look at the entire relationship of Shell and
Nanakuli, what would we see? Assuming there was no established trade
usage or course of performance, the court could still consider all facts
reflecting on dealings between the parties. For example, it was an almost
symbiotic relationship akin to a partnership;0 6 there was regular
cooperation between the parties;"0 7 the Oahu paving market was very
small and there was complete trust among suppliers and pavers;'0 8
Shell's representative was often in the Nanakuli office and attended bid

100. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Or. 1991).
101.

RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 205 cmt. a (1979).

102. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1995) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 71-117 (1980) [hereinafter
MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT]; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment ofLong-Term Economic

Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 886900 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracts].
104. MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 103, at 20-35; Macneil, Contracts, supra
note 103, at 885.
105.

MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 103, at 66-70; Macneil, Contracts,supra

note 103, at 895.
106. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 781-84.
108. Id. at 784.
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openings;" ° when Nanakuli wished to expand its plant, Shell supported
the idea by giving an additional volume discount"' and by helping
Nanakuli obtain a bank loan;.. and, this contract was an effort to join
together so that Nanakuli's paving
business and Shell's asphalt supply
2
business would thrive on Oahu."
The argument for a duty obligating Shell to assist Nanakuli is
simply that the spirit of this more expansive contract demands it. As one
commentator puts it: "[A]s a result of the circumstances at or after the
time of contracting, each party reasonably expected the other to act
consistently with its interests by being flexible and cooperating to
preserve the relationship when serious trouble arose.""' Nanakuli
would expect assistance and Shell ought to provide it.
Suppose, however, that Shell does not provide assistance (as it in
fact did not). Should Nanakuli have an action for breach of contract or
simply a reason to distrust Shell and refuse to do business with it in the
future? When we broaden our inquiry to take in all the facts, we again
face the problem of distinguishing legal duties from voluntary acts.
One advocating a relational duty to assist would like the jury to
consider everything about the relationship." 4 He would like the judge
to give the jury a very open instruction on good faith."' The jury, left
109. Id. at 783.

110. Id. at 781.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 780-81.
113. Hillman, supra note 1,at 7.
114. See Patterson, supra note 3, at 208-09.
115. For an example of an open good faith instruction based upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979), see United States Nat'l Bank v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082,
(Or. 1991):
Now I further instruct you that there is an obligation of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of every contract. The purpose of the good faith doctrine
is to prohibit improper behavior in the performance and enforcement of contracts. The
phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts and its meaning varies somewhat with
the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness
to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party.Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation ofgoodfaith andperformanceeven
though the actor believes his conduct to be justifed,but the obligationgoes further. Bad
faith may be overt or may consist of inaction andfair dealing may require more than
honesty. When one party to a contract is given discretion in the performance of some
aspect of the contract, the parties ordinarily contemplate that the discretion will be
exercised for particular purposes. If the discretion is exercised for purposes not
contemplated by the parties, the party exercising discretion has performed in bad faith.
Id. at 1085 (quoting the trial court's jury instruction on good faith). The Oregon Supreme Court
reversed and found the instruction in error because the U.C.C. in the case only required honesty in
fact. Id.
at 1091.
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to ponder the close relationship, could find for the plaintiff by imposing
a community standard of appropriate behavior on the defendant.
CONCLUSION

So what we have is "commercial palimony." If Shell is liable, it is
because its relationship with Nanakuli evolved into something like a
partnership. The agency of transformation is the jury" 6 utilizing a
broad good faith standard applied to a vast array of facts (all of the
surrounding circumstances).
There are significant problems with this theory. First is the question
of whether good decisions will be made. A court performs two functions:
it settles disputes and it provides guidelines for future behavior of
others. "' The "commercial palimony" theory may not perform either
function well. Perhaps Llewellyn's merchant jury could sift through all
the facts and find the truth of the matter with no better road map than the
good faith standards provide. It is less likely that an ordinary jury can.
Even more serious, such an open factual inquiry means the guidelines for
future behavior will be necessarily vague.
More importantly, there is a difference between a relationship and
a contract. Not every action has legal consequences. The promoters of a
good faith duty of assistance are blurring the line between law and
society. Relational values are important and society has relational ways
to enforce them (if you behave like a sleaze your reputation will suffer).
As Macaulay suggests, most parties to close relations will never see the
courthouse." s Law, however, is about drawing lines, setting limits, and
establishing rights. Shell ought to know why it will be held liable.
Nanakuli and Shell, as commercial parties with attorneys, can draft a
partnership agreement if they want the assurance that the courts will
impose partnership liability. If they would like to target the price term,
they could provide a gross inequities adjustment provision which requires
good faith bargaining in the face of substantial change and provide for
arbitration if the parties cannot agree." 9 If each party is willing to
leave assistance in times of trouble to the good graces of the other, there
will be an occasional disappointment.

116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
117. See John Kidwell, A Caveat, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 615, 618.
118. See Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations, supra note 69, at 61; Macaulay, Use andNonUse of Contracts,supra note 69, at 17.
119. See Hillman, supra note 1, at 4.
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A proponent of the duty to assist admits the duty should not exist
when the parties are holding contract law as a club in reserve. But when
does a party like Shell not hold contract law in reserve?1 2 1 Our proponent answers: "Suppose, however, that the parties contract under circumstances creating an expectation of flexibility, without acknowledging the
contract club. Under traditional objective assent theory of contract
formation, the club is lost."'2 Here finally we have it. Parties to a
contract apparently must warn each other that they really mean it. That
was supposed to be the function of entering the contract in the first place.
The "commercial palimony" theory elevates the community, through
the jury," over the individual parties. It places great faith in the jury
and very little in the parties. The theory devalues the functions of form
(the act of executing a writing warns the parties of the potential
significance of their acts, evidences their seriousness, and draws a line
between legally significant and insignificant acts).' m Contract rights
become fluid, not settled. A party may drift into added liability with no
clear signposts.
The signposts are key. I would not wish that we return to the
classical theory of Williston. Expanding the definition of contract to
place more emphasis upon trade usage and actual dealings of the parties
seems a great improvement. These devices focus upon specific practices
of the parties or in the trade which can be proven and which the parties
would assume are part of the deal. 24 To the extent good faith involves
adherence to specific proven practices, as in the actual Nanakuli
case,"z it seems fine as well.
As the law currently stands, there is no generally recognized good
faith duty of assistance. However, as previously discussed, a contracting
party who has assisted the other party in a particular way before or
during the term of the contract may be legally obligated to continue the
practice. In addition, some courts seem willing to consider a previous
general pattern of cooperative behavior as a factor in a decision to limit
the right of a contracting party to subsequently assert its individual self-

120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. See supra note 86.
123. See Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-01 (1941).
124. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1995).
125. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 806 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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126
interest under the contract.
Our ideas about contract and contracting parties are changing. As
ideas change so eventually does the law. Beliefs do control actions.
There is growing acceptance of the idea that a broad factual inquiry is
necessary to determine what constitutes the contract. In the process,
however, the original idea of Llewellyn, that we are searching for the
bargain in fact is not always kept at the forefront. Contracting parties are
increasingly seen as "partners" with a common interest, rather than
individuals with separate interests. As this relational view of the contract
and the parties becomes more generally accepted new legal obligations
are sure to follow. Changes in employment law over the last twenty-five
years give a glimpse of what can happen when fundamental beliefs
change.
Caring and kindness are virtues. It is hard to argue against them.
Nevertheless, one should remember that they can be part of society
without being forced by law and when forced they are no longer
virtues.' 27

126. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 978-79 (5th Cir.
1976); Fleming Companies v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 818 P.2d 813, 822 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); J.R.
Hale Contracting Co. v. United N.M. Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 589 (N.M. 1990).
127. Cf. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 91 (1981).
Nothing in the liberal concept of contract, nothing in the liberal concept of humanity and
law makes such altruism improbable or meaningless. The disposition to view one another
with kindness and forbearance is an affirmative good, which liberalism is in no way
committed to deny. But, just as in the family, the enforcement of such a posture itself
tends to tyranny.
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